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DEFINING RELIGION DOWN:
HOSANNA-TABOR, MARTINEZ, AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT
CARL H. ESBECK

Big River, the musical adaptation of Mark Twain's

THE

ADVENTURES OFHUCKLEBERRYFINN, begins the second act with the duet

"Worlds Apart," involving Huck and the runaway slave, Jim, wondering
how two could cohabit the antebellum South whose lives are "worlds
apart, worlds apart."' So it is with the United States Supreme Court's
recent duet on the First Amendment and religious freedom: HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission2 and ChristianLegal Society Chapter,Hastings
College of the Law v. Martinez.3 Hosanna-Tabor was unanimous.

Martinez split along the familiar 4-4, liberal-conservative divide, with
Justice Anthony Kennedy casting the deciding vote. The decision in
Hosanna-Taborwent in favor of the claimant, confirming that there are
restraints on the government when it imposes employment
nondiscrimination regulations on a religious organization. Martinez went
against the claimant, upholding the power of a state university to require
a student religious organization to conform to a nondiscrimination policy
regulating the group's membership and choice of leaders. HosannaTabor prohibited government interference in the selection of religious
leaders. Martinez allowed it.
Scholars were initially struck by how different the results. They
were worlds apart. Two hasty explanations were advanced. First, Justice
Elena Kagan had replaced Justice John Paul Stevens. That had a
. R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul
C. Lyda Professor of Law,
University of Missouri.
1. ROGER MILLER, Worlds Apart, in BIG RIVER: THE ADVENTURES OF
HUCKLEBERRY FINN 58 (1986).
2. 565 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
3. 561 U.S.

, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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modicum of explanatory power, as Justice Stevens only rarely favored
religious claimants. But a one-Justice change did not explain the sharp
contrast in outcomes nor unravel the surprising unanimity of HosannaTabor. Second, perhaps the answer lays with the anti-textual position
taken by the Office of Solicitor General (OSG), U.S. Department of
Justice in Hosanna-Tabor. All that is required by the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment, argued the OSG, is that government be formally
neutral with respect to religion and religious organizations. That duty
was satisfied when Congress enacted a nondiscrimination statute, which
by its terms treated religious organizations just like other employers
when it came to prohibiting discrimination. The legislation was thus
facially neutral. The OSG conceded that religious employers such as the
church-related school in Hosanna-Taborhad freedom of association, but
so did labor unions, service clubs, and the like, and they were all subject
to the same nondiscrimination legislation.
Freedom of association,
argued the OSG, only called for ad hoc balancing of the interests of the
group in question in promoting its ideas against the interests of the
government in nondiscrimination.6 The OSG's position meant that, so
far as the religion clauses were concerned, the government could blind
itself to the fact that the affected employer happened to be religious; no
7
rule grounded in the text of the religion clauses was necessary. The
Court's reaction to the OSG's religion-blind government was to deride
the position as "remarkable," "untenable," and hard to square with the
text of the First Amendment which plainly singles out religion for special
protection.8 So the anti-textual position pushed forward by the OSG may
have struck the Bench as so extreme as to have undercut those Justices
otherwise inclined to be sympathetic, namely those in the Martinez

4. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706.
5. Id.
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-43, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2011) (No. 10-533), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/
argument transcripts/10-553.pdf. During oral argument, the Bench sank the OSG's
case-by-case balancing approach by posing hypotheticals that would force the civil
courts to take sides on religious questions in violation of the Establishment Clause.
7. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706.
8. Id. ("That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment
itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.").
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majority, thereby giving an opening for Chief Justice John Roberts to
write a unanimous opinion in Hosanna-Tabor.
But are these cases worlds apart? Or, upon a closer look, are the
rationales similar in one material respect: the cases share a narrow
definition of religion, namely, that in its most important aspects religion
is a matter of belief but not also deeds, and that the core of religion takes
place largely out of the public eye in those buildings on the street corner
with the steeple on top. If this is indeed a common thread, then the two
cases harmonize around an understanding that religion is fully protected
only when exercised in private.
I.
Martinez involved Hastings College of the Law, which is part of
the state university system in California. Like most institutions of higher
education, Hastings had formalized its rules for recognizing a diverse
array of student-initiated organizations. Official recognition made these
special interest groups eligible to schedule meetings in classrooms during
noncurricular hours, to access various channels of communication, such
as the College's webpage and bulletin boards, and to use Hastings' name
to identify themselves.9 As is common, recognition was conditioned on
compliance with Hastings' nondiscrimination policy, which in its written
form barred discrimination on various bases such as race, national origin,
and gender, including religion and sexual orientation.
The Supreme Court has several times vindicated the rights of
student groups at state universities when excluded from recognition on
the basis of an organization's speech or viewpoint.o The issue at the
college at Hastings was unusual, however. Hastings claimed to apply its
written policy in a manner requiring that these interest groups allow any
law student to become a member and to attain positions of leadership.
9. Hastings' policy said that it "neither sponsor[ed] nor endorse[d]" the views
of recognized groups, and it insisted that student groups inform others that the
organization was not an official arm of the law school. Brief for Petitioner at 4,
Martinez, 2010 WL 71183 (No. 08-1371) (January 28, 2010).
10. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 83031 (1995) (involving a religious student newspaper); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 269-70 (1981) (regarding a religious student organization); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 185-88, 194 (1972) (concerning a leftist student political organization).
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Although this "all-comers" application of the written policy was
contested, the majority opinion, authored by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, decided Martinez on such an understanding." The student
chapter of the Christian Legal Society (CLS) required that its voting
members and leaders be professing Christians, thus the organization was
selective on the basis of religion. CLS also believed that sexual intimacy
should be confined to marriage, which in some instances would have the
effect of excluding sexually active students on various bases including
same-sex orientation.
CLS sought to argue the case based on the written
nondiscrimination policy which, by its terms, targeted groups such as
CLS on the bases of the organization's views on religion and gay sexual
conduct.12 As noted above, however, the Court majority accepted
Hastings' gloss on its policy, namely, that all comers must be admitted
by all groups. Martinez thus presented for plenary review a policy
formally neutral as to religion. And, as the Court triumphantly pointed
out to frustrated CLS lawyers, "[i]t is . . . hard to imagine a more

viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept
all comers." 3 It was also true that the all-comers policy had a disparate
impact on CLS. So the next step was to determine whether the allcomers interpretation was adopted by Hastings with the hidden purpose
of suppressing CLS's expression. The Court concluded, over a sharp
dissent, that there was no evidence of a hidden purpose on the record
before it.14 In the eyes of the majority, Hastings claimed a plausible

11. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2982-84.
12. CLS distinguished between same-sex orientation as a person's status and

gay sexual conduct. This is much like the distinction between a person who thinks

about committing adultery but does not and a person who does commit adultery. The
Court, however, refused to acknowledge such a distinction in the context of
homosexuality. Id. at 2990.

13. Id at 2993 (emphasis in original). CLS observed that if Hastings sought to

have a diversity of viewpoints among its recognized student organizations, then the
all-comers policy was silly because it undercut the goal of such diversity. Perhaps,
acknowledged the Court, but Hastings was not bound to having as its purpose ever
increasing group diversity. Id. at 2992. Hastings could have other viewpoint-neutral
purposes, such as full extracurricular access by all students.
14. Id. at 2995; cf id. at 3016-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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purpose, namely, ensuring access by all law students to extracurricular
groups that have Hastings' recognition."
The all-comers policy, however, has a discriminatory effect on
the expression of all student organizations that have exclusionary
membership policies (such as CLS, but also the Law Student Democratic
Caucus, Vietnamese American Law Society, La Raza, etc.).16 The Court
conceded that was true, but the Free Speech Clause protects speech, not
acts. So the Court brushed aside CLS's hardship noting that "acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory
idea or philosophy." 7 Further explaining, the Court said: "The Law
School's policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members
without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior .

..

More

to this belief-acts distinction, the Court said, "CLS's conduct-not its
Christian perspective-is, from Hastings' vantage point, what stands
between the group and [recognition by Hastings]."' 9 Thus, crucial to the
holding was that CLS was not being excluded because of its religious
beliefs, but because of its actions. CLS pointed out that its noncompliant
actions were speech acts, for the actions affirmed CLS's Statement of

15. Id. at 2989 (majority opinion). It should not go unnoticed that Hastings'
all-comers requirement subtly shifts the character of university recognition policies.
The normative purpose of such policies is to encourage students with common
interests to pursue them collectively while expanding associational diversity beyond
the strict confines of the curriculum. No university seal of approval is needed, orfor that matter-to be implied. Indeed, university authorities have come to enjoy
deniability concerning actions by student organizations. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text. The all-comers policy, however, elevates all-student inclusion
over student-initiated diversity, see supra note 13, which acts as a drag on
associational pluralism and diminishes the clarity of group messaging. The same
criticism could be leveled at, for example, prohibiting racial or gender
discrimination. But these are suspect classes, unlike the "class"-if one can call it
that-of all students.
16. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994; see id. at 3004 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating
that the record reflects several instances where Hastings registered student groups
with bylaws limiting membership to those with similar viewpoints including the
Hastings Democratic Caucus and the Vietnamese American Law Society).
17. Id. at 2994 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
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Faith. 20 But the Court thought that no concern of the Free Speech
Clause. Hastings is permitted to exclude CLS because of its acts,
explained the majority, so long as Hastings does so for a purpose other
than the suppression of CLS's beliefs.21
This distinction works only if the definition of "religion" permits
the Martinez Court's hermetic separation between beliefs that are
religious and actions that profess a religion. But the nature of religion, at
least for many religions such as Christianity and Islam, to name the
world's two largest, is to have an integrated view of belief and action or
22
doctrine and practice. The Court's protection of beliefs but not actions
means that CLS can privately believe anything it wants, but it cannot
manifest those beliefs in the act of admitting to membership or
leadership only those who will sign its Statement of Faith. Likewise, the
Court's protection of beliefs but not actions means that CLS can believe
anything it wants about God's intentions concerning sexual fidelity, but
CLS had best not take note of whether its members and leaders openly
fail to practice what they preach. If "religion" as used in the First
Amendment is confined to passive belief, this is indeed a privatized
notion of religion. No word of advice was forthcoming from the
Martinez majority as to how a religious organization-indeed, any
organization serious about ideas-can maintain its institutional integrity
and clarity of message when it cannot choose its members or even its
leaders.
Having rejected CLS's free speech claim of viewpoint
discrimination, its free exercise claim was brushed aside by the Court in
23
24
a footnote citing Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith. The Court
in Smith held that a neutral law's discriminatory effect on a religious
practice is not, without more, unconstitutional. Smith stated its rule this
way: There is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause where a law is
20. CLS required voting members and leaders to sign a Statement of Faith. Id.
at 2980. Signing was an act, albeit an act affirming a set of beliefs.

21. Id. at 2994-95.

See

RICHARD B. HAYS, THE MORAL VISION OF THE NEw TESTAMENT: A
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS 313-16 (1996)

22

(proposing a way to analyze the New Testament and a method for applying it to the
task of resolving current moral disputes).
23. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 n.27.
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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generally applicable and neutral as to religion.2 5 The Martinez majority
deemed Hastings' all-comers policy to be neutral and generally
applicable, so CLS's religious exercise was not protected by the Free
Exercise Clause.2 6
II.
In January 2012, the Supreme Court handed down HosannaTabor. The case involved a fourth-grade teacher, Cheryl Perich, suing
her employer, a church-based school, alleging retaliation for having
asserted a claim under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA).27 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed the original suit, and
Perich intervened as a party. In the lower federal courts the church
school raised the "ministerial exception," which recognizes that under
the First Amendment, religious organizations have the authority to select
their own ministers. Over the last forty years the ministerial exception
has been recognized by every federal circuit to have considered it.28
Indeed, the exception overrides not just the ADA, but also a number of
29
venerable employment nondiscrimination civil rights statutes. Just who

25. Id. at 878-82.
26. Martinez did not discuss the actual text of the Free Exercise Clause which
enjoins government from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. However, the
plain meaning of the word "exercise" connotes more than just passively holding to a
set of beliefs, but includes the active practice of those beliefs. It is true that in a
modem and complex nation, a society with many people of differing faiths and none,
religiously motivated actions will inevitably be subject to greater regulation than the
passive holding of beliefs. But, as Smith and now Martinez would have it, absent
intentional discrimination, religiously motivated exercise is outside the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. Congress was so displeased with Smith that in 1993 it
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-04
(2006). See id. § 2000bb(a)(4) (congressional finding critical of Smith).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
28. See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the MinisterialException, 90 N.C.
L. REv. 1 (2011).
29. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the bases of race, color, national
origin, sex, and religion); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)
(prohibiting sex discrimination in pay); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based on age).
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is a "minister," however, had varied somewhat from circuit to circuit 30 and in any event the Supreme Court had never taken a case involving the
ministerial exception.
The Hosanna-TaborCourt wrote that:
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so,
intrudes upon more than a mere employment
decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of
control over the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs."
The Court went on to say that although "[t]he interest of society in the
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly
important ... so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission."3
Accordingly, in a lawsuit that strikes at the ability of a church to
internally make decisions concerning its faith or mission, any balancing
of interests between a vigorous eradication of employment
discrimination, on the one hand, and institutional religious freedom, on
the other, is. a balance already struck by the First Amendment in favor of
the church.
In addition to math, social studies, and language arts, Perich
taught classes in religion, led students in prayer, and occasionally
conducted chapel. The Court found that Perich was a minister. However,
for purposes of this essay, Hosanna-Taboris of interest for a different
reason.
The Court drew a sphere of autonomy around church
governance, a term that includes more than the hiring and firing of
ministers. It did so in the course of the need to distinguish the leading
case of Employment.Division of Oregon v. Smith, mentioned above.
Oregon had listed peyote, a hallucinogenic, as one of several
controlled substances and criminalized its use. The plaintiffs in Smith

30. Lund, supra note 28, at 65-66 (collecting cases).
31. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706.
32. Id. at 710.
33. Id. ("When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for
us.").
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were members of the Native American Church, and held jobs as
counselors at a private drug rehabilitation center.3 4 They were fired for
illegal drug use (peyote), and later denied unemployment compensation
by Oregon because they had lost their jobs for cause. Members of the
35
Native American Church ingest peyote in the course of a sacrament.
The Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated
when Oregon enacted a drug law of general applicability that was neutral
as to religion, even though the law happened to have an adverse impact
on a religious practice (sacramental peyote use). In Hosanna-Tabor,
Chief Justice Roberts admitted that the ADA was likewise a general law
of neutral applicability that happened to have an adverse impact on the
church-based school's ability to fire a classroom teacher.36 But he then
drew a crucial distinction between Hosanna-Taborand Smith:
[A] church's selection of its ministers is unlike an
individual's ingestion of peyote. Smith involved
government regulation of only outward physical
The present case, in contrast, concerns
acts.
government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the
church itself. See [Smith, 494 U.S.] at 877
(distinguishing the government's regulation of
"physical acts" from its lending its power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious
authority or dogma).37
Hosanna-Taborthus ruled that there is a class of cases, to which the rule
in Smith does not apply, described as "an internal church decision that
affects . . . faith and mission . . . .,,38 The firing of Perich, deemed a
minister, was characterized as "internal," meaning a decision of the
church affecting faith or mission. In contrast, criminalizing peyote use
was characterized as "outward," meaning that the denial of
unemployment compensation because of illegal drug use did not regulate
an internal decision of the Native American Church. Further, the

34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
35.
36.
37.
3 8.

Id.
Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 707.
Id. (some quotation marks and brackets removed).
Id.
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ingestion of peyote in Smith was characterized as regulating a "physical
act," whereas the firing of Perich regulated by the ADA was said to be
not a "physical act" but a "church decision."39
In having to distinguish Smith, the decision in Hosanna-Tabor
became about more than just the ministerial exception. It is now a
leading case for church autonomy, meaning internal church decisions
affecting faith or mission. Obviously a sacrament is an important
religious practice and obviously the members of the Native American
Church suffered a burden on religious conscience that went unremedied
in Smith. But the point of Hosanna-Taborwas not to remedy burdens on
religious conscience. If it were, then Hosanna-Tabor would have
overruled Smith. That did not happen. Rather, Hosanna-Tabor carved
out an exception to Smith. What was remedied in Hosanna-Tabor was
not a burden on religious conscience, 40 but government interference with
41
the internal autonomy of the religious school's mission.
The future task is to delimit the scope of Hosanna-Tabor.That
means determining those subject matters (in addition to firing a minister)
that come within the Court's description of "internal church decision[s]."

39. This passage in Hosanna-Tabor references Smith where it also says that
the exercise of religion often involves "the performance of (or abstention from)
physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or
certain modes of transportation." Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
Presumably the neutral regulation of such "physical acts" falls under the rule of
Smith rather than Hosanna-Tabor.
40. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 709 ("The purpose of the exception is not to
safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious
reason.").
41. The Court's distinction between Smith and Hosanna-Taborwill surely be
contested as new cases arise. It is true that a governance decision by a church was
not directly countermanded in Smith like it was by the ADA in Hosanna-Tabor.In
Smith, the plaintiffs were fired from their jobs at a drug counseling center because of
peyote use and then later denied unemployment compensation because of the
criminal activity. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Neither the loss of their jobs nor the denial
of compensation directly countermanded the claimants when observing a sacrament
of their Native American Church. For all practical purposes, however, the actual
practice of peyote ingestion during the sacrament was discouraged or driven
underground. But-as I state in the text-Oregon's drug laws imposed a burden on
religious conscience, whereas Hosanna-Tabor is not about lifting burdens on
religious conscience. Rather, Hosanna-Taboris about church autonomy.
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There is help from another quarter: Justice Samuel Alito's concurring
opinion, joined by Justice Kagan, said that this subject-matter class of
cases recognizes a "religious autonomy" found in the no-establishment
and free-exercise phrases that together protect "a private sphere within
which religious bodies are free to govern themselves in accordance with
their own beliefs."42 While "an internal church decision" clearly
includes more subjects than firing ministers, the scope of this class of
cases is not broad and Smith remains the general rule. The "internal"
matters of Hosanna-Taborare a discrete set of decisions made in the
relative privacy of a virtual building with a steeple on top, by individuals
holding authority to govern "the church itself' in its "faith and mission."
III.
To receive the most rigorous First Amendment protection for
religion from the Supreme Court, it appears that the definition of religion
(Martinez) and the scope of church autonomy (Hosanna-Tabor)are first
cabined. This suggests a resurgence of the privatization of religious
observance because religion harbors illiberal ideas.
The paring back on fully protected religion is also evident on a
front that is administrative rather than judicial. The ongoing dispute over
the federal healthcare contraception mandate arises because employerrequired health insurance plans must cover the full range of
contraception approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including
certain drugs and devices that also work as abortifacients.43 This
42. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). See also Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[R]eligious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal
affairs, so that they may be free to: select their own leaders, define their own
doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.") (quoting
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1389 (1981)).
43. The federal healthcare act requires employers to provide healthcare plans
that include preventive care, but the act does not define the contours of preventive
care. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)
(2006). That task was delegated to the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA). On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted "Required Health Plan
Coverage Guidelines" that defined the scope of women's preventive services for
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requirement has the effect of imposing a burden on conscience for some
religious employers, most prominently Catholic employers, as to all
contraception, as well as anti-abortion Protestant employers and other
religions opposed to abortifacients.4 The Executive Branch decided that
in order to be exempt for reasons of conscience, a "religious employer"
must meet all of the following criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the
purpose of the organization. (2) The organization
primarily employs persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization. (3) The organization
serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization. (4) The organization is a
nonprofit organization as described in § 6033(a)(1)
and § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.45
satisfying the employer mandate. Women's Preventive Services: Required Health
Plan Coverage Guidelines, HEALTH
RESOURCES
&
SERV.
ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited July 31, 2012). These
guidelines adopted all of the contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug
Administration as the standard for the minimum services required in a healthcare
plan.
According to the Office of Women's Health, Food and Drug Administration,
the Affordable Care Act required contraception drugs and devices that may also
work to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg in the uterus are Plan B, Plan B OneStep, Next Choice, Ella, and the copper inter-uterine device. Birth Control Guide,
FDA
OFFICE
OF
WOMEN'S
HEALTH,
16-18
(Aug.
2012),
http://www.fda.2ov/downloads/ForConsumers/BvAudience/ForWomen/FreePublicat
ions/UCM282014.pdf.
44. Two Protestant institutions of higher education, Grace College and
Seminary and Biola University, have sued the federal government alleging that the
mandate's requirement pertaining to abortion inducing drugs is violative of religious
conscience. See Christian opposition to abortion pill mandate grow, two more
colleges
sue,
ALLIANCE
DEFENDING
FREEDOM
(Aug.
23,
2012),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/7602. Similarly, the evangelical Wheaton
College has sued the federal government on the basis that the government's forced
provision of drugs that cause an abortion is violative of the free exercise of religion.
See Wheaton College v. Sebelius (2012-current), THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/wheaton/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2012).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2006). Most religious charitable
organizations fall under

§

6033(a)(3)(A)(ii), and thus for that reason alone do not

satisfy the definition of "religious employer."
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This exemption covers little more than houses of worship. That means
that religion-based social service and healthcare agencies are not exempt
from the mandate, nor are religious schools, colleges, and universities.
The nature of protected religion in the Executive Branch's
definition is that its essence is about teaching doctrine and providing
services to those already members of the church. This meaning excludes
serving the poor and needy when "outside" the church, and does not
perceive religion at its core as about educating youth within a world and
life view that includes God. That crabbed meaning pretty much guts the
answer to "Who is my neighbor?" in the parable of the Good
46
Samaritan.
This election-year clash was entirely avoidable. The options
before the Executive Branch were not a Sophie's Choice. On the one
hand, there is the important goal of reproductive health, including
preventive care, for women working at religious hospitals, charities,
schools, and universities. And it is understood the Executive Branch
insists that no co-pays be incurred by women with respect to
contraception. On the other hand, public-serving organizations should
not be deemed to have forfeited their First Amendment rights when they
reach out to help the poor, the needy, the sick, and students, thereby
punishing these ministries of hope that are major contributors to society's
safety net and educational system. Hobbling such important groups
within civil society is reckless play with a diverse nonprofit sector that
Americans widely support with their money and volunteer hours.
Contraception is cheap and readily available. If the federal
government were to put its goodwill and vast resources behind the effort,
there are multiple means of delivering these services to the women in
question that are convenient and free. The method need only be
unconnected to the objecting religious employer, thereby not implicating
religious conscience by an act or omission of the employer. For
example, the states could be ultimately responsible for payment, with the
means of tender being online state-issued coupons easy for women to
redeem at their pharmacy or medical clinic. The additional taxpayer
expense, if any, is the price Americans collectively pay for an open
society that honors the cause of conscience.

46. Luke 10:25-37.

14

FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 11I

There are also entanglement problems with the Executive
Branch's shrunk-down definition of "religious employer." For example,
how is the administrative apparatus to make determinations concerning
religious teachings, values, and events including: (i) whether an
organization's "purpose" is "the inculcation of religious values," (ii)
whether an organization "primarily" employs those who share its
religious tenets, (iii) whether an organization "primarily" serves those
who share its religious tenets, and (iv) who does and does not "share" the
organization's religious tenets? 47 All this administrative probing and
classifying raises constitutional concerns given that church-state
separation prohibits government officials from making what are
essentially religious determinations when interpreting the words and
.48
practices of a religious organization.
The percentage of Americans who place a high priority on
protecting religious freedom is thought by some to be in decline. 4 9 That
can be tested and perhaps reversed by a crisis of conscience such as the
healthcare contraceptives and abortifacients mandate. But a crisis
response is often too late when the decision-maker is the unelected
judiciary. The judiciary is designed to be immune to politics and
majority rule. There is more immediate help to be found in the Religious
47. Apparently the Executive Branch is unaware of the degree to which
America's pews are filled with people who regularly attend a church but have not
joined as members, as well as members of a church who dissent in material part from
the tenets taught by the magisterium. See Study shows widespread confusion and
ignorance on the subject of official membership in a place of worship, GREY
MATTER
RESEARCH
&
CONSULTING
(Aug.
29,
2012),
http://greymatterresearch.com/indexfiles/Membership.htm.
48. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6 (1981) ("[T]he
university-and ultimately the courts" have no constitutional authority "to inquire
into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in
varying circumstances by the same faith."). For example, which activities are
considered "inculcation" of the faith and who is a co-religionist are religious
questions that will be answered differently by different religious groups under
varying circumstances. Id. (singing and scripture reading by one student religious
group are regarded as "worship" in some circumstances, but by another sect is not
considered a part of a "worship service"); see also id at 272 n.11 (definitional
distinctions in university's policy invite excessive entanglement).
49. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism,and Secularization: The
Shaking Foundations of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755,
1773-80 (2011).
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Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).5o The Act is applicable
where the federal government is the agent imposing a burden on
religion.5 RFRA has a definition of "religious exercise" that suggests
breadth, instructing the courts and administrators that protected religion
is neither confined to religious practices that are compelled by a faith nor
to religious practices that are central to a faith. Moreover, an important
but until now under-appreciated feature of RFRA is that religious acts
are protected, not just passive beliefs,5 and that "religious exercise"
54
covers more than disputes affecting internal church autonomy.

50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
51. Id. at § 2000bb-3(a).
52. Id. § 2000bb-2(4), cross-referencing the definition at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(7)(A) (2006). Both inquiries are to be avoided because they raise Establishment
Clause problems for civil courts having to take sides over religious differences.
53. In RFRA, religious exercise includes more than religious belief. Compare
42 U.S.C. at § 2000bb-1(a) (all substantial burdens on religious exercise are covered
by the act) with § 2000bb-3(c) (burdens on religious belief are not authorized by the
act, even in the face of compelling governmental interests).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) ("The term 'religious exercise' includes any
exercise of religion.").

